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Death Delayed Is Retribution Denied 
Russell L. Christopher† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In many of the top death penalty states, the leading cause 
of death for prisoners on death row is not lethal injection. Nor 
is it the electric chair. It is not even any form of execution. It is 
death by natural and other causes.1 From 1973–2011, in four of 
the top five states with the largest death row populations in 
2011, more death row prisoners died of old age than were exe-
cuted.2 In California during that period, for every one prisoner 
executed, six died on death row of other causes.3 In Pennsylva-
nia during the same period, a death row prisoner was nine 
times more likely to die from other causes than by execution.4 
The ballooning number of prisoners spending decades on death 
row who will die prior to execution stems from the combined ef-
 
†  Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa. Thanks to Lyn Entzeroth, 
Jeffrey Fagan, George Fletcher, Stephen Galoob, Ken Levy, Brent Newton, 
Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., Peter Oh, Tamara Piety, and Eric Reynolds for 
their helpful comments. I also thank participants in workshops of a previous 
version of this Article at Columbia University School of Law, University of 
Tulsa College of Law, and the Law and Society Conference. Copyright © 2014 
by Russell L. Christopher. 
 1. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH 
PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2010) (citing “natural causes” as the 
leading cause of death for convicted murderers on death row); Ernest van den 
Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1662 
(1986) (“[M]ost convicts sentenced to death are likely to die of old age.”); David 
Von Drehle, When Harry Met Scalia: Why the Death Penalty Is Dying, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 6, 1994, at C3 (“What should a man on death row fear most: elec-
trocution, gassing or lethal injection? Try: Old age.”).  
 2. Aggregating the totals from California, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Al-
abama, 142 prisoners were executed and 206 died from other causes. See 
TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAP-
ITAL PUNISHMENT, 2011 – STATISTICAL TABLES, NCJ242185, 18 tbl.15, 20 
tbl.17 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS 2011]. The other state in the top 
five is Texas. See id. at 18 tbl.15. 
 3. See id. at 20 tbl.17.  
 4. See id. 
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fects of the lengthy appeal and review process,5 intentional de-
lay by prisoners,6 states’ constitutionally defective procedures,7 
and states’ lack of resources.8 Nationwide, the average tenure 
on death row has risen from several weeks in the eighteenth 
century,9 to two years in 1968,10 to six years in 1984,11 to ten 
years in 1996,12 to fourteen years in 2009,13 and to almost sev-
enteen years in 2011.14 Recently, one prisoner’s stay on death 
row reached thirty-nine years.15 What was once a brief period of 
pre-execution confinement followed by a near-certain execution 
has now become either “life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole, but with the possibility of death,”16 or a lengthy 
term of incarceration—upwards of thirty years or more—
 
 5. See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957–58 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Court and the low-
er federal courts have converted the constitutional limits upon imposition of 
the death penalty . . . into arcane niceties which parallel the equity court prac-
tices described in Charles Dickens’ ‘Bleak House.’”).  
 6. See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., 
concurring) (referring to the prisoner’s “interminable efforts of delay”). 
 7. E.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., re-
specting denial of certiorari) (“[D]elays have multiple causes, including ‘the 
States’ failure to apply constitutionally sufficient procedures . . . .’” (quoting 
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari))).  
 8. See, e.g., Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row 
Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 700–01 n.15 (2007) (noting that a death row 
prisoner waited almost seventeen years for his automatic appeal to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court); Sara Colón, Comment, Capital Crime: How Califor-
nia’s Administration of the Death Penalty Violates the Eighth Amendment, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 1377, 1391 (2009) (noting a lack of “qualified trial counsel”).  
 9. E.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 
17 (2002) (noting that the typical period between sentence and execution was 
one to several weeks in colonial America).  
 10. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 n.37 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (cit-
ing 33.3 months as the national median period of death row incarceration), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 27, as recog-
nized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009).  
 11. See DOJ STATISTICS 2011, supra note 2, at 14 tbl.10.  
 12 . See id.  
 13. See id.  
 14. See id. 
 15. Muhammad v. Florida, No. 13-8030, 13A674, 2014 WL 37226, at *1 
(U.S. Jan. 7, 2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The pris-
oner, Thomas Knight, received his death sentence in 1975. Knight v. Florida, 
528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 16. Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of 
Death: Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unu-
sual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1614 (2013).  
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followed by execution.17 And this problem will only become 
worse as the length of death row tenures continues to rise.18 
In principle, delay in the imposition of punishment is not 
ideal. Apart from the oft-uttered slogan “justice delayed is jus-
tice denied,”19 delay diminishes the purposes and undermines 
the justifications of punishment. As the influential eighteenth-
century Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria20 maintained, 
“[t]he more prompt the punishment is and the sooner it follows 
the crime, the more just and useful it will be. I say more just, 
because it spares the criminal the useless and cruel torments of 
uncertainty . . . .”21 Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarian-
ism, contended that the more distant or less proximate the pun-
ishment, the lesser the deterrent effect.22 And as leading con-
 
 17. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majori-
ty’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 319 (2011) 
(“[T]he death penalty is not the punishment for murder in the United States; 
the penalty instead is life without the possibility of parole, but with a small 
chance of execution a decade later.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, En-
trenchment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 30 LAW & INEQ. 211, 230–31 
(2012) (“The death penalty now encompasses two separate punishments: 
lengthy incarceration under very severe conditions (essentially solitary con-
finement in many states), followed by an execution.”).  
 18. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged of Death 
Row Should Be Deemed Too Old To Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1090 
(2012) (“The ranks of the long serving [on death row] are steadily growing.”); 
Kara Sharkey, Comment, Delay in Considering the Constitutionality of Inor-
dinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon and the Eighth Amendment, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 861, 864 (2013) (“[T]he length of time prisoners spend on death 
row [is] increas[ing].”). 
 19. 190 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1868) 1771 (U.K.). The phrase appears 
to have been coined by Liberal Party leader and future Prime Minister Wil-
liam Gladstone in a speech to the House of Commons advocating measures 
that would relieve Ireland of the obligation to pay tithes to the Anglican 
Church. Id. 
 20. E.g., BANNER, supra note 9, at 91 (characterizing Beccaria’s volume on 
punishment, containing his critique of capital punishment, as “one of the most 
influential books of the eighteenth century”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an 
Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 127 (“Beccaria’s essay shaped the gen-
eral structure of the debate about the death penalty on both sides of the Atlan-
tic in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”).  
 21. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 36 (David Young, 
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1986) (1764). Prompt punishment is more effective 
by reinforcing the perception that punishment is “the necessary and inevitable 
result” of crime. Id.  
 22. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 173 (J.H. 
Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1970) (1789) (noting “[t]he defi-
ciency of the punishment in point of proximity”); see also id. at 170 (“Punish-
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temporary capital punishment scholars Carol and Jordan 
Steiker concluded, “extending the time between sentence and 
execution undercuts two of the most pressing pro-death-penalty 
arguments: deterrence and retribution.”23 
In practice, however, with respect to non-capital punish-
ment, delay is generally accepted for two reasons. First, any de-
lay is apt to be de minimis. Second, even if a delay is apprecia-
ble, it is remediable. Post-conviction, any detention counts 
toward fulfilling a sentence of imprisonment.24 And pre-
conviction, any detention will be credited as time served.25 Be-
cause the nature of the prisoner’s experience during the de-
lay—confinement in a holding cell—is sufficiently similar to the 
nature of the prescribed punishment—imprisonment—reducing 
the sentence of imprisonment by the length of the delay sup-
plies a remedy.26 
But neither of these reasons applies to delay in the imposi-
tion of capital punishment. First, decades-long delays are not 
minimal.27 Second, there is no clearly acceptable remedy. Be-
cause of the different nature of death row incarceration (DRI) 
and capital punishment, the former cannot be subtracted from 
the latter.28 Short of voiding the death sentence, there is no way 
to give credit to the prisoner for time served while awaiting ex-
ecution.  
 
ment must be further increased in point of magnitude, in proportion as it falls 
short in point of proximity.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 23. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 17, at 230.  
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2012) (“A sentence to a term of imprisonment 
commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting trans-
portation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the of-
ficial detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.”).  
 25. Id. § 3585(b) (“A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of 
a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to 
the date the sentence commences . . . .”).  
 26. See Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 1141, 1147 (2013) (“Federal judges, for example, are required by statute 
to give credit for time served, as are many state judges.” (citing § 3585(b) and 
numerous state statutes)).  
 27. E.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of stay of execution) (noting petitioner’s thirty-three-year tenure on 
death row).  
 28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a)–(b) (limiting credit for time served during de-
tention to punishments involving “a term of imprisonment”). 
CHRISTOPHER_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:28 PM 
2014] DEATH DELAYED 425 
 
Even capital punishment proponents agree that substan-
tial delay between sentence and execution is objectionable.29 
And they even agree as to the reason—it undermines the pur-
poses of punishment. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, 
“[t]here can be little doubt that delay in the enforcement of cap-
ital punishment frustrates the purpose of retribution.”30 Refer-
ring to the delay, Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski and 
Sean Gallagher similarly commented that “[w]hatever purposes 
the death penalty is said to serve—deterrence, retribution, as-
suaging the pain suffered by victims’ families—these purposes 
are not served by the system as it now operates.”31  
But capital punishment proponents and opponents disa-
gree as to the constitutionality of and remedy for such substan-
tial delay. Their disagreement has crystallized over what has 
become known as the “Lackey claim.”32 In 1995, Justice John 
Paul Stevens drafted a memorandum regarding the Court’s de-
nial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas.33 Regarding petitioner’s ar-
gument that execution following his seventeen years of DRI 
would violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
“cruel and unusual punishment,” Justice Stevens commented 
 
 29. Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983) (per curiam) (Burg-
er, C.J., concurring) (“The argument . . . that capital punishment is cruel and 
unusual is dwarfed by the cruelty of 10 years on death row . . . .”).  
 30. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 960 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari). 
 31. Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sen-
tence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995). 
 32. E.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive 
Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 762 
(2002) (“[T]he claim of inordinate delay of execution [is] commonly known as a 
‘Lackey claim’ . . . .”). Brent Newton, counsel for the death-row prisoner Clar-
ence Lackey and architect of the “Lackey claim,” explains the claim as follows: 
  Lackey’s Eighth Amendment claim had two discrete components, 
both of which contended that his execution would be a “disproportion-
ate” punishment and, thus, cruel and unusual: first, that the state’s 
carrying out the execution after keeping Lackey under the extreme 
conditions of death row for such a lengthy period of time would exact 
more punishment than the state was entitled to under the Eighth 
Amendment; and second, that neither of the state’s primary interests 
in capital punishment—retribution and deterrence—would be mean-
ingfully served in Lackey’s case after such a lengthy delay, particular-
ly because it was primarily attributable to the state and not to Lack-
ey. 
Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 54–55 (2012).  
 33. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).  
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that Lackey’s claim, “[t]hough novel . . . is not without founda-
tion.”34  
In several subsequent Lackey claim petitions, Justice Ste-
vens expressed support for the prisoners’ claims, Justice Steven 
Breyer dissented from the denials of certiorari, and Justice 
Clarence Thomas concurred in the denials of certiorari.35 These 
dueling memoranda among the three Justices, spanning nearly 
twenty years, comprise a lively debate. Justices Breyer and 
Stevens argue that such delay may be unconstitutional on ei-
ther of two principal grounds. First, it is cruel and unusual 
punishment.36 Second, it frustrates the purposes of punish-
ment.37 The remedy is barring execution after such delays.38 
Justice Thomas finds the delay constitutional because it is due 
to efforts to ensure that the prisoner receives due process39 and 
prisoners’ exploitation of these procedural requirements to 
manufacture delay.40 Because delay extends the life of the pris-
oner, the prisoner naturally opts for and benefits from the de-
lay.41 Otherwise, a prisoner is free to craft his own remedy by 
simply “submitting to . . . execution.”42  
In addition to the ultimate merit of Lackey claims, the Jus-
tices disagree as to their seriousness. Justices Breyer and Ste-
vens find Lackey claims “important”43 and worthy of the full 
 
 34. Id. at 1045.  
 35. See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text.  
 36. E.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of stay) (“I have little doubt about the cruelty of [thirty-three years] of 
incarceration under sentence of death . . . . So long a confinement followed by 
execution would also seem unusual.”).  
 37. E.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
joined by Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“[T]he penological justifi-
cations for the death penalty diminish as the delay lengthens.”).  
 38. E.g., id. (“[A] successful Lackey claim would have the effect of render-
ing invalid a particular death sentence . . . .”). 
 39. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in denial of certiorari) (“[T]he delay in carrying out the prisoner’s exe-
cution stems from this Court’s Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”).  
 40. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari) (referring to a prisoner’s “litigation strategy, 
which delays his execution”). 
 41. See, e.g., id. (emphasizing that “petitioner chose to challenge his death 
sentence”).  
 42. E.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner could long ago have ended [the de-
lay] . . . by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to de-
serve: execution.”).  
 43. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting 
denial of certiorari).  
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Supreme Court’s attention.44 Moreover, as Justice Breyer main-
tains, “[w]here a delay, measured in decades, reflects the 
State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, 
the claim that time has rendered the execution inhuman is a 
particularly strong one.”45 In contrast, Justice Thomas derides 
Justice Breyer’s arguments as “musings”46 and dismisses Lack-
ey claims as “mak[ing] ‘a mockery of our system of justice.’”47 
Attempting to break this impasse, this Article undertakes 
the first comprehensive assessment of Lackey claims under re-
tributivism.48 With empirical studies either inconclusive,49 or 
affirmatively establishing that capital punishment fails to de-
ter crime beyond noncapital forms of punishment,50 or even es-
tablishing that capital punishment increases crime,51 the Su-
 
 44. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1070 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
joined by Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“Most regrettably, a ma-
jority of this Court continues to find these issues not of sufficient weight to 
merit our attention.”).  
 45. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
 46. Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).  
 47. Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in denial of certiorari) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 
1995)).  
 48. For a succinct explanation of retributivism, see John Rawls, Two Con-
cepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955) (“[T]he retributive view is that pun-
ishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is 
morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his 
wrongdoing.”). For further explication of retributivism, see infra Part I.B.  
 49. Compare Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment 
Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
703, 711–13 (2005) (citing studies suggesting a strong deterrent effect from 
capital punishment), with John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses 
of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 
(2005) (criticizing those same studies as unreliable because of the low inci-
dence of executions relative to the dramatically higher incidence of murder), 
and Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal 
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 269–89 (2006) 
(criticizing studies purporting to establish capital punishment’s deterrent ef-
fect). 
 50. See, e.g., William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder, Capital Pun-
ishment, and Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, in THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN AMERICA 135, 155 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (“The available evidence 
[including a review of sixty articles] remains ‘clear and abundant’ that, as 
practiced in the United States, capital punishment is not more effective than 
imprisonment in deterring murder.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capi-
tal Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 240 
(2005) (noting studies suggesting capital punishment increases the murder 
rate through a “brutalization effect”).  
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preme Court enshrines retributivism as the “primary justifica-
tion for the death penalty.”52 Despite retributivism’s central 
role in justifying capital punishment per se, neither case law 
nor scholarly commentary includes a thorough analysis of the 
justifiability of the combination of substantial DRI plus capital 
punishment (the Combination) under retributivism. Capital 
punishment opponents largely assert, without demonstrating, 
that the Combination fails to further retributivism. And they 
largely assume, without questioning, that DRI constitutes 
criminal punishment (rather than a civil sanction). Because its 
legal status is unclear, this Article presents and supports five 
different possible conceptions of DRI. Applying retributivism to 
each of these conceptions, this Article demonstrates that sub-
stantially delayed capital punishment violates retributivism.  
In order to find common ground, this Article’s argument 
adopts many of the premises and contentions of capital pun-
ishment proponents. First, the argument assesses the Combi-
nation under the theory of punishment—retributivism—that 
proponents find most persuasive and ignores a deterrence-
based punishment theory that is more favorable to capital pun-
ishment opponents.53 Second, it concedes retributivism’s justifi-
cation of capital punishment per se. Third, the argument does 
not make the legally unsubstantiated assumption that DRI is 
necessarily “punishment.” And finally, it concedes the possibil-
ity that DRI may even be a benefit to the prisoner; by delaying 
death, the prisoner’s life is extended. As such, DRI may be a 
mitigation of the capital punishment. 
 
 52. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984); accord Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 79–80 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[R]etribution [is] the primary 
rationale for imposing the death penalty.”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[R]etribution provides the main justification 
for capital punishment . . . .”); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he interest that we have identified as the princi-
pal justification for the death penalty is retribution . . . .”).  
 53. See Rapaport, supra note 18, at 1121 (“[Regarding Lackey claims], ret-
ribution is to the fore and deterrence recedes in that the plausibility of addi-
tional deterrent value in execution after decades of incarceration . . . is diffi-
cult to defend. The Court’s Lackey debates therefore turn on whether decades-
plus-death is excessive retribution offensive to the Eighth Amendment.”). 
Rapaport observes that “Justice Thomas apparently concedes as much in not-
ing that Justice Breyer’s criticism of execution after long delay for lack of addi-
tional deterrent effect would be remedied by reverting to something like our 
earlier and sprightlier system [when delays between sentencing and execution 
were only a matter of weeks and months.]” Id. at 1121 n.160 (citing Knight v. 
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 n.1 (1999)). 
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From the very premise that retributivism justifies capital 
punishment per se, this Article demonstrates that the Combi-
nation is unjustified under retributivism. And it is unjustified 
regardless of whether DRI constitutes additional punishment 
aggravating capital punishment or a life-extending, beneficial 
mitigation of capital punishment. And by being unjustified un-
der retributivism, the Combination loses the primary support 
for its constitutionality. 
This Article unfolds in the following parts. After Part I 
provides a brief introduction to the constitutionality of capital 
punishment, the principles of retributivism, and retributivism’s 
application to capital punishment, Part II provides an overview 
of the issue of substantial DRI. It first sketches a history of the 
issue prior to Lackey. Next, Part II summarizes the debate over 
the Lackey claim. It presents eight principal arguments as to 
the unconstitutionality of the Combination and ten principal 
arguments supporting its constitutionality.  
Part III demonstrates how the Combination violates re-
tributivism. Because the status of substantial DRI is unclear, it 
presents five possible approaches: (i) additional punish-
ment, (ii) a lessening or mitigation of the capital punish-
ment, (iii) either additional punishment or a mitiga-
tion, (iv) both additional punishment and a mitigation, 
and (v) legally and retributively nothing. Despite accepting as a 
premise that retributivism justifies capital punishment per se, 
this Part demonstrates that under each of the first four ap-
proaches, the Combination is undeserved, disproportional, and 
unjustified under retributivism. Only under the fifth ap-
proach—that upwards of thirty years or more of DRI is legally 
and retributively nothing—is the Combination possibly justi-
fied. But this approach yields an absurdity. When death row 
incarceration culminates in death by old age or nonexecution 
causes, blameworthy perpetrators of heinous murders would 
receive no punishment whatsoever (by construing DRI as noth-
ing) despite being in state custody upwards of thirty years or 
more after sentencing. To avoid this absurdity, substantial DRI 
must constitute additional punishment. But this only brings us 
back full circle. As additional punishment, the Combination is 
unjustified. The resulting dilemma is that either substantial 
DRI culminating in death by execution is unjustified under re-
tributivism or such incarceration culminating in death by old 
age entails the absurdity of blameworthy, convicted capital of-
fenders receiving no punishment. After considering several 
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possible resolutions to the dilemma, this Part argues that con-
verting death sentences to life imprisonment sentences is the 
preferable resolution. Finally, this Part anticipates and rebuts 
three possible objections. With retributivism enthroned as the 
primary justification for the constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment, and the Combination violating retributivism, this Ar-
ticle concludes that the Combination may be unconstitutional. 
I.  RETRIBUTIVISM AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT   
Before applying retributivism to the Combination, some 
background on capital punishment and retributivism may be 
helpful. This Part supplies a brief introduction to the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment, the principles of retributivism, 
and retributivism’s specific application to capital punishment. 
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
The modern era of death penalty jurisprudence in the 
United States perhaps begins with the Supreme Court’s invali-
dation of capital punishment in 1972, in Furman v. Georgia.54 
The disparate opinions of the justices in the majority coalesced 
into two common themes. First, the imposition of the defend-
ants’ death penalties was arbitrary and capricious.55 Second, 
the challenged death penalties failed to further the goals and 
purposes of acceptable theories of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence. As Justice Brennan explained, “[i]f there is a signif-
icantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purpos-
es for which the punishment is inflicted . . . the punishment in-
flicted is unnecessary and therefore excessive.”56 And as Justice 
White declared, capital punishment that fails to further the 
purposes of deterrence and retribution “would then be the 
pointless and needless extinction of human life with only mar-
ginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. 
A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be 
patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative 
of the Eighth Amendment.”57 
In the next landmark case, Gregg v. Georgia, the Court up-
held capital punishment as per se constitutional, and a plurali-
ty enunciated a two-part framework for assessing capital pun-
 
 54. See generally 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  
 55. See id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 309–10 (Stewart, J., con-
curring).  
 56. Id. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).  
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ishment’s constitutionality.58 First, capital punishment must be 
found not only historically acceptable at the time of the Eighth 
Amendment’s adoption in 1791, but also acceptable under “‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society’”—acceptable to contemporary society.59 Citing 
the literal text of the Constitution60 and the prevalence of capi-
tal punishment in every state at the time of ratification of the 
Eighth Amendment,61 the Court found it historically acceptable. 
Referencing the thirty-five state legislatures’ reenacting death 
penalty statutes62 and the numerous jury decisions imposing 
death in the wake of Furman,63 the Court found it presently ac-
ceptable.  
Second, capital punishment must also satisfy human digni-
ty.64 In addition to torture and other “barbarous” modes of exe-
cution65 that are “cruelly inhumane,”66 the principle of human 
dignity bars excessive punishments.67 One type of excessive 
punishment is an unnecessary punishment.68 Punishment fail-
ing to further acceptable goals of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence—is unnecessary.69 Such punishment constitutes “the 
gratuitous infliction of suffering”70 and “the unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.”71 Although skeptical of the deterrent 
 
 58. See 428 U.S. 153, 169–87 (1976).  
 59. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
 60. See id. at 177 (“It is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself 
that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers.”). The 
Court noted that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “contemplated” capi-
tal punishment by imposing restrictions on its imposition. Id.  
 61. See id. (“At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, capital pun-
ishment was a common sanction in every State.”).  
 62. See id. at 179–80.  
 63. Id. at 182 (“At the close of 1974 at least 254 persons had been sen-
tenced to death since Furman.”).  
 64. See id. at 173 (explaining that capital punishment “must accord with 
‘the dignity of man,’ which is the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment’” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100)).  
 65. Id. at 170–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 66. Id. at 175.  
 67. Id. at 173 (stating that punishment consistent with human dignity 
“means, at least, that the punishment not be ‘excessive’”).  
 68. See id.  
 69. See id. at 183.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 173; accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (stating 
that such punishment would be “‘nothing more than the purposeless and need-
less imposition of pain and suffering’ and [thus] unconstitutional” (quoting 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  
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value,72 the Court deferred to the findings of state legislatures 
that capital punishment promoted deterrence.73 More confident 
of capital punishment’s furtherance of retribution, the Court 
found that giving the capital offender what he deserved served 
to express and channel “society’s moral outrage” at the crime 
and forestall vigilantism.74 Another type of excessive punish-
ment is disproportional punishment.75 Unable to declare “[capi-
tal] punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime [of 
murder],” the Court held that capital punishment is not per se 
unconstitutional because it is neither unacceptable under 
evolving standards of decency nor violative of human dignity.76 
Although Gregg held that “the death penalty is not invari-
ably unconstitutional . . . the Court insists upon confining the 
instances in which the punishment can be imposed” to a very 
limited class of offenders and offenses.77 Since Gregg, most con-
stitutional challenges to capital punishment center on claims of 
disproportionality.78 Stating that the Eighth Amendment bars 
excessive as well as cruel and unusual punishments,79 the 
Court explained that this protection “flows from the basic ‘pre-
cept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduat-
 
 72. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185 (noting that statistical studies as to the de-
terrent value of capital punishment over that of life imprisonment “simply 
have been inconclusive”).  
 73. See id. at 186 (“The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of 
crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the 
legislatures.”).  
 74. Id. at 183–84.  
 75. See id. at 173 (assessing proportionality between the punishment and 
“the severity of the crime”); id. at 187 (assessing proportionality of capital pun-
ishment “in relation to the crime for which it is imposed”).  
 76 . Id. at 187. Interestingly, as of 2008, there are now five Gregg Justic-
es—Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens—who have declared 
that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. See Elisabeth 
Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in Baze 
v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 783, 791 (2010).  
 77. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (citation omitted).  
 78. See LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
LAW 32 (3d ed. 2012).  
 79. The Court’s distinction between excessive versus cruel and unusual 
punishments is susceptible to confusion. According to the Court, all excessive 
punishments necessarily violate the cruel and unusual punishments clause of 
the Eighth Amendment and are thus unconstitutional. But not all cruel and 
unusual punishments are excessive punishments. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 
419 (“The [Eighth] Amendment proscribes ‘all excessive punishments, as well 
as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.’” (quot-
ing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 n.7 (2002))).  
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ed and proportioned to [the] offense.’”80 Determining the satis-
faction of this “proportionality precept,” or “[p]roportionality 
review,”81 requires assessment of capital punishment under 
“[e]volving standards of decency [that] must . . . express respect 
for the dignity of the person.”82 Decency entails “restraint and 
moderation in use of capital punishment;”83 “use of the death 
penalty [must] be restrained . . . and limited in its instances of 
application.”84 Informing that proportionality review is both an 
objective and subjective analysis.85 First, the Court considers 
“‘objective indicia of society’s standards,’”86 primarily state 
statutes and jury sentencing decisions.87 Second, in the com-
paratively more subjective portion of the analysis, the Court 
applies its own independent evaluation and understanding of 
the Eighth Amendment to determine “[w]hether the death pen-
alty is disproportionate to the crime committed”88 or for a class 
of offender.89 Capital punishment is unconstitutionally dispro-
portional or excessive if it either (i) is disproportional to the 
crime committed or (ii) fails to promote the legitimate goals and 
purposes of punishment—retribution and deterrence.90 As to 
the second ground, capital punishment must promote the 
penological goals to a degree that is “significant” or “measura-
 
 80. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 367 (1910)). For similar language see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
560 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311. 
 81. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12.  
 82. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420.  
 83. Id. at 436.  
 84. Id. at 446–47.  
 85. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 613 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (dividing the Court’s analysis into its “objective” and “subjective” compo-
nents).  
 86. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
563 (2005)).  
 87. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (noting both that 
sixteen states had recently passed legislation prohibiting capital punishment 
for the mentally retarded and that there were few such executions in states 
still allowing it, the Court concluded that a “national consensus” had emerged 
and held executions of such persons to be unconstitutional).  
 88. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.  
 89. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“We then must determine, in the exercise 
of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a dispropor-
tionate punishment for juveniles.”).  
 90. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 318–21.  
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ble.”91 But “‘[a] punishment might fail the test on either 
ground.’”92  
In some cases the Court ruled capital punishment uncon-
stitutional by primarily relying on the first ground of dispro-
portionality. In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia, the Court held that 
capital punishment was unconstitutionally disproportional for 
the crime of rape without analyzing whether it furthered goals 
of punishment.93 And, in 2008, the Court in Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana held that capital punishment for the crime of rape of a 
child is unconstitutionally disproportional despite being unable 
to rule out that it serves penological goals.94 
In other cases, the Court relied on the second ground of 
failure to further penological goals. For example, in 2002, the 
Court in Atkins v. Georgia found capital punishment of the 
mentally retarded to be unconstitutionally disproportionate 
based on the two prongs of a national and international consen-
sus opposing it, and its failure to further accepted penological 
goals.95 Conceptualizing retribution as “the interest in seeing 
that the offender gets his ‘just deserts,’” the Court reasoned 
that capital punishment was undeserved given the lesser cul-
pability of the mentally retarded.96 Similarly, in Roper v. Sim-
mons, in 2005, the Court ruled that execution of juvenile of-
fenders was unconstitutional as disproportionate based on the 
same two prongs.97 Finding that execution of juveniles failed to 
 
 91. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (using the 
standard of “‘measurably contribut[ing] to the retributive end’” of punishment 
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982))); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 593 n.4 (1977) (referring to a standard of “measurably serv[ing] the 
legitimate ends of punishment”).  
 92. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 n.4). To clar-
ify, a punishment may fail the test on either ground because a punishment 
may be unconstitutionally disproportional even if it furthers legitimate goals 
of punishment. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592–93 n.4 (“Because the death sen-
tence is a disproportionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual pun-
ishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may 
measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment.”).  
 93. See 433 U.S. at 592. The Court explained that “[b]ecause the death 
sentence is a disproportionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may 
measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment.” Id. at 592–93 n.4.  
 94. See 554 U.S. at 446. The Court conceded that “[a]s in Coker, here it 
cannot be said with any certainty that the death penalty for child rape serves 
no deterrent or retributive function.” Id. at 441.  
 95. See 536 U.S. at 321.  
 96. Id. at 319.  
 97. See 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).  
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further retributivism, the Court characterized the retributivist 
goal as either “an attempt to express the community’s moral 
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to 
the victim.”98  
B. RETRIBUTIVISM 
Whereas consequentialism justifies punishment by the 
good consequences generated by punishment—deterrence, re-
habilitation, incapacitation—the good consequences of punish-
ment are irrelevant to retributivism’s justification of punish-
ment.99 Under retributivism, an offender’s desert is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for justified punishment: (i) 
only those who deserve punishment may be punished; (ii) all 
those who deserve punishment must be punished; and (iii) 
those who deserve punishment must be punished neither less 
than nor more than what they deserve.100 Because the justifia-
bility of the Combination implicates only the second and third 
principles, these will be our focus.  
Retributivism imposes a duty to punish all culpable 
wrongdoers.101 As Immanuel Kant, perhaps the father of retrib-
utivism,102 famously declared, “[t]he principle of punishment is 
a categorical imperative.”103 While some contemporary retribu-
tivist accounts view punishment of offenders as merely permis-
 
 98. Id. at 571.  
 99. See, e.g., Gertrude Ezorsky, The Ethics of Punishment, in PHILOSOPH-
ICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT xi, xi (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) (ex-
plaining that unlike under a consequentialist or utilitarian view, retributiv-
ism’s justification of punishment is “irrespective of any further good 
consequence, e.g., crime prevention”).  
 100. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 91 (1997) (“Retributivism 
. . . justifie[s] . . . punish[ment] because and only because offenders deserve it. 
Moral responsibility (‘desert’) in such a view is not only necessary for justified 
punishment, it is also sufficient. . . . [T]he moral responsibility of an offender 
also gives society the duty to punish.”); Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To 
Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 
1319, 1324 (2004) (noting that retributivism “obligates the state to punish an 
offender because and to the extent, but only to the extent, he deserves to be 
punished”).  
 101. E.g., IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1989) 
(identifying “[t]he moral duty to punish” as one of retributivism’s central prin-
ciples).  
 102. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspec-
tive, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 533–34 (1987).  
 103. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 141 (Mary Gregor ed. 
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797). 
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sible,104 the “dominant”105 and “standard retributive view”106 
finds punishment of wrongdoers to be obligatory. As Michael 
Moore, the leading modern retributivist,107 stated, “the retribu-
tivist regards the punishment of the guilty to be categorically 
imperative.”108  
The formula for determining the amount or degree of an of-
fender’s deserved punishment has evolved over time. Echoing 
the biblical lex talionis of “eye for eye, tooth for tooth,”109 Kant 
propounded the “principle of retribution, of like for like”:110 
 [W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another . . . you inflict 
upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult yourself; if you steal from 
him, you steal from yourself; if you strike him, you strike yourself; if 
you kill him, you kill yourself. But only the law of retribution (ius 
talionis) . . . can specify definitely the quality and the quantity of pun-
ishment.111 
Under this “principle of equality,”112 the deserved punishment 
for a crime is whatever the criminal did to his victim.113 Pun-
ishment takes the form of the crime reciprocated back onto the 
criminal. Retributive punishment is “the crime turned round 
against itself.”114 For example, a murderer must be executed, a 
thief dispossessed of his belongings, etc. Rather than the specif-
ic equality espoused by Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, one of the two 
 
 104. See, e.g., H. J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 
8 INQUIRY 249 (1965), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUN-
ISHMENT, supra note 99, at 119, 132.  
 105. PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 110. Though the “duty to punish” may 
be sensitive to “facts calling for mercy,” it is still “paramount.” Id. 
 106. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 961, 1229 n.660 (2001). 
 107. See Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 959, 960 (2000) (“No contemporary criminal theorist rivals Moore in 
his unqualified enthusiasm for retribution.”); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Co-
herence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Ju-
risprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1185 (2003) (“Moore has offered one of 
the most sustained and thorough explications of retributivism.”). 
 108. MOORE, supra note 100, at 156. 
 109. Exodus 21:23–25 (“Wherever hurt is done, you shall give life for life, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, bruise 
for bruise, wound for wound.”).  
 110. KANT, supra note 103, at 141. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 101 at 127 
(Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) 
(explaining that by punishment, “what the criminal has done should also hap-
pen to him”).  
 114. Id. at 129. 
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leading traditional retributivists along with Kant,115 argued 
that the crime and punishment must merely be generally 
equal.116 From this general equality, the modern view evolved 
that the amount or degree of deserved punishment must corre-
spond with,117 “fit,”118 or be proportional to the degree of gravity 
of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender.119 As 
H.L.A. Hart explained, “modern retributive theory is concerned 
with proportionality.”120 Antony Duff noted that the principle of 
proportionality is “intrinsic to any version of retributivism.”121 
As the Supreme Court put it, “[p]roportionality is inherently a 
retributive concept.”122 And “[t]he concept of proportionality is 
central to the Eighth Amendment . . . [and encompasses] the 
‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be gradu-
ated and proportioned to [the] offense.’”123 
 
 115. E.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 13 (“The most important and in-
fluential among classical retributivists are Kant and Hegel.”).  
 116. Hegel required that a punishment be comparable in character or value 
to the crime: 
[E]quality remains merely the basic measure of the criminal’s essen-
tial deserts, but not of the specific external shape which the retribu-
tion should take. It is only in terms of this specific shape that theft 
and robbery [on the one hand] and fines and imprisonment etc. [on 
the other] are completely unequal, whereas in terms of their value, 
i.e. their universal character as injuries . . . they are comparable. 
HEGEL, supra note 113, § 101 at 129.  
 117. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the 
retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the 
personal culpability of the offender.”). 
 118. Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY 29, 32 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972); accord Joel Feinberg, Punishment, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 516 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 2d ed. 
1980) (“The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally 
guilty offender is that amount which fits, matches or is proportionate to the 
moral gravity of the offense.”).  
 119. E.g., PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 12 (“Punishment ought to be pro-
portionate to the offense (the lex talionis).”); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347–48 (1983) (“[T]he severity of punishment 
should be proportional to the degree of wrongdoing . . . .”); Rawls, supra note 
48, at 4–5 (explaining that an offender should be punished “in proportion to 
his wrongdoing”).  
 120. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234 (1968). 
 121. R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 132 
(2001).  
 122. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991); accord Ewing v. Cali-
fornia, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Proportionality—the 
notion that the punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied 
to the penological goal of retribution.”).  
 123. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).  
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Disproportional punishment may be either too much or too 
little.124 Referring to punishments that are “either too much, or 
too little,” Igor Primoratz concluded that they are “in both cases 
disproportionate, and thus unjust and wrong, from the stand-
point of retributive theory.”125 Norval Morris and Michael Tonry 
noted that “[a] thoroughgoing retributivist would claim that the 
punishment to be imposed on an offender should be exactly ‘as 
much as he deserves, no more, no less.’”126 Richard Frase stated 
that under a retributivist just desert theory, “all offenders 
should receive their particular deserts—no more and no less.”127 
Jean Hampton explained that too little punishment may be 
even worse than too much: “From a retributive point of view, 
punishments that are too lenient are as bad as (and sometimes 
worse than) punishments that are too severe.”128 As a result, 
punishments that are either too severe or too lenient are dis-
proportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributiv-
ism.129 
 
 124. See, e.g., HEGEL, supra note 113, § 214 at 245 (“[A]n injustice is done if 
there is even one lash too many, or one dollar or groschen, one week or one day 
in prison too many or too few.”).  
 125. PRIMORATZ, supra note 101, at 162. 
 126. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBA-
TION 84 (1990).  
 127. Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 76 
(2005).  
 128. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal 
of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1691 (1991). Dan Markel explains the 
wrong of disproportional leniency: “If the state . . . fail[s] to mete out punish-
ment that is commensurate with the severity of the crime, [it] lends plausibil-
ity to the offender’s claim of superiority over society and his victim. Punishing 
insufficiently . . . aid[s] the offender’s claim of superiority . . . .” Dan Markel, 
State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row 
and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 446 
(2005).  
 129. Under one variant of retributivism, punishments equal to or less than 
what is deserved and proportional are permissible. Variously called “negative 
retributivism,” J. L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1982), or “weakened versions” of retributivism, HART, su-
pra note 120, at 233, the only limitation imposed on the amount of punish-
ment is a ceiling but not a floor. For example, if an offender deserves ten years’ 
imprisonment, any punishment equal to or less than ten years’ imprisonment 
satisfies negative retributivism. Even zero punishment satisfies negative re-
tributivism. For this reason, negative retributivism is not considered a justifi-
cation of punishment—it fails to provide an affirmative reason to punish any 
offender with any punishment. E.g., R. A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent 
Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7 (1996) (“[Nega-
tive retributivism] clearly provides no complete justification . . . for it tells us 
that we may punish the guilty (their punishment is not unjust), but not that or 
why we should punish them.”). As a result, retributivism is generally under-
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C. RETRIBUTIVISM’S JUSTIFICATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Both Kant and Hegel insisted that retributivism demands 
capital punishment for murder. While allowing some depar-
tures from specific equality between crime and punishment,130 
Kant maintained that “every murderer . . . must suffer 
death.”131 As Kant declared, “If, however, he has committed 
murder he must die. Here there is no substitute that will satis-
fy justice. There is no similarity between life . . . and death, 
hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution unless 
death is judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer.”132 Despite 
realizing that “retribution cannot aim to achieve specific equal-
ity” between crime and punishment, Hegel acknowledged “this 
is not the case with murder, which necessarily incurs the death 
penalty.”133 The measure of general equivalence cannot deter-
mine the deserved punishment for murder “since none is equiv-
alent to life—but only in the taking of another life.”134 
Contemporary courts and commentators widely view re-
tributivism as supplying a justification, and the most compel-
ling justification, of capital punishment.135 As Carol and Jordan 
 
stood to not mean negative retributivism. E.g., Michael S. Moore, Punishment, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 759, 759 (Robert Audi ed., 2d 
ed. 1999) (“Retributivism is also not the view (sometimes called ‘weak’ or ‘neg-
ative’ retributivism) that only the deserving are to be punished, for desert on 
such a view typically operates only as a limiting and not as a justifying condi-
tion of punishment.”).  
 130. See KANT, supra note 103, at 141–42 (citing as an example, the de-
served punishment of a wealthy thief might differ from that of a poor thief).  
 131. Id. at 143; accord id. at 145 (“The categorical imperative of penal jus-
tice remains (unlawful killing of another must be punished by death).”). 
 132. Id. at 142. 
 133. HEGEL, supra note 113, § 101 at 129.  
 134. Id. at 129–30. 
 135. E.g., JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE 
SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 110 (2014) (“The real justification for 
preserving capital punishment surely rests on the interest in retribution. 
[It] . . . provides an explanation for preserving capital punishment that is both 
more realistic and more acceptable than any other. . . . [W]hether we should 
retain the death penalty depends on the strength of the interest in retribu-
tion. . . .”); van den Haag, supra note 1, at 1669 (stating that capital punish-
ment is “the only fitting retribution for murder I can think of”); Markel, supra 
note 128, at 423 (“[C]ourts and commentators commonly justify the death pen-
alty in the language of retributive justice.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 323, 335 (2003) (“The 
central justification for the death penalty in the modern era has been retribu-
tion.”); Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants 
To Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of Col-
lective Responsibility, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 719 n.91 (2006) (“[Retribution] is 
the paramount theory undergirding the constitutional legitimation of capital 
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Steiker characterized the conventional argument, 
“[r]etributivism’s insistence on proportional punishment as a 
matter of the offender’s ‘just deserts’ offers powerful support to 
death penalty proponents, who maintain that only death is a 
proportional punishment for at least some heinous murders.”136 
Not all, however, believe that retributivism successfully justi-
fies capital punishment.137 Even some retributivists oppose the 
death penalty.138 And perhaps most contemporary retributivists 
conclude that retributivism does not require capital punish-
ment.139  
II.  SUBSTANTIAL DEATH ROW INCARCERATION   
This Part first sketches a brief overview of the issue of DRI 
and significantly delayed capital punishment. Next, it surveys 
the principal arguments both for and against the constitution-
ality of the Combination.  
A. OVERVIEW 
While the issue of delay between sentencing and execu-
tion—referred to as the “death row phenomenon” in foreign 
courts140—rose to its current prominence in 1995 in Lackey v. 
 
punishment, insofar as retribution as a punishment theory is rooted in Kanti-
an notions of respect for persons. Personal culpability, not deterrence, repeat-
edly surfaces as the most important consideration in capital decisionmaking.” 
(citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137, 149 (1987); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (White, J., dis-
senting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461–62 (1984); Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782, 798–801 (1982)).  
 136. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 20, at 152.  
 137. See, e.g., Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the 
Death Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1307 (2006) (“If the retributivist thinks 
torturing a torturer is unjustified, then it is always possible that killing a 
murderer is also unjustified.”); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is 
Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 751, 769 (2005) (arguing that retributivism fails to justify capi-
tal punishment on a number of grounds, including execution of the innocent).  
 138. See, e.g., Markel, supra note 127, at 458–68 (finding capital punish-
ment’s arbitrariness and offensiveness to human dignity incompatible with 
retributivism); David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital 
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6, 11–15 (1998) (opposing capital punishment 
on numerous grounds including prolonged DRI undermining retributivism). 
 139. See infra notes 302–03 and accompanying text.  
 140. David A. Sadoff, International Law and the Moral Precipice: A Legal 
Policy Critique of the Death Row Phenomenon, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 77, 
93 n.106 (2008) (explaining that unlike a death row phenomenon claim, a 
Lackey claim “dispenses with any consideration of detention conditions or per-
sonal circumstances such as youth or mental infirmity, and focuses exclusively 
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Texas,141 it has long been recognized.142 The Supreme Court 
perhaps first addressed the issue, albeit in dicta, in the 1890 
case In re Medley.143 The Court opined that for a prisoner on 
death row, “one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be 
subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole 
of it . . . . [The] immense mental anxiety amount[ed] to a great 
increase of the offender’s punishment.”144 What was the period 
of DRI that constituted additional punishment increasing the 
prisoner’s capital punishment? Four weeks.145  
Beginning in 1960, courts began to squarely address the is-
sue. In Chessman v. Dickson, the Ninth Circuit, refusing to “of-
fer life (under a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall 
the processes for a given number of years,” upheld a twelve-
year delay as constitutional.146 The California Supreme Court, 
however, in People v. Anderson in 1972, held that capital pun-
ishment violated the state constitution that prohibited cruel or 
unusual punishment, in part based on lengthy DRI: “The cruel-
ty of capital punishment [also] lies . . . in the dehumanizing ef-
fects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution . . . .”147 
Eight years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
also based, in part, its ruling that capital punishment was un-
constitutionally cruel on the delay between sentence and execu-
tion.148 The court explained that “‘mental pain is an inseparable 
 
on the duration of death row confinement and its adverse psychological im-
pact”).  
 141. 514 U.S. 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).  
 142. E.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995) (“While Jus-
tice Stevens’ memorandum in Lackey has given prominence to the argument 
that delay in carrying out a death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the legal theory underlying the claim is not new.”). 
 143. 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
 144. Id. at 172. 
 145. Id.  
 146. 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960). 
 147. 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972). Later that year, however, California 
voters approved Proposition 17 to amend the state constitution such that capi-
tal punishment was neither cruel nor unusual punishment. E.g., Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the 
Death Penalty in “Executing” Versus “Symbolic” States in the United States, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1899 (2006).  
 148. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 
(Mass. 1980), superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. art. 
CXVI (holding that “the death penalty, with its full panoply of concomitant 
physical and mental tortures, is impermissibly cruel under art. 26 [of the Dec-
laration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution] when judged by contem-
porary standards of decency”). Passed in 1982 by referendum, Amendment 116 
amends article 26 of the Declaration of Rights to explicitly provide that the 
CHRISTOPHER_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:28 PM 
442 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:421 
 
part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, for the 
prospect of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the 
inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the 
actual infliction of death.’”149 But in 1992 the Ninth Circuit 
again rejected a claim that delayed execution—this time for 
sixteen years—constituted cruel and unusual punishment.150 
And just a few years before Lackey, British Commonwealth and 
international human rights courts found substantial DRI to be 
“inhuman” and “degrading.”151  
In 1995, Justice Stevens’ landmark Lackey Memorandum 
invited lower courts to consider the issue. “Though the im-
portance and novelty of the question . . . [suffice] to warrant re-
view by this Court, those factors also provide a principled basis 
for postponing consideration of the issue until after it has been 
 
state constitution is not to be construed to forbid the death penalty. This 
amendment remains in force; however, the Massachusetts statute allowing for 
the imposition of the death penalty was later invalidated on separate constitu-
tional grounds. Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984). No legis-
lation authorizing the death penalty has been passed in Massachusetts since 
the Colon-Cruz decision, and the death penalty is considered effectively una-
vailable in the state. See, e.g., Alan Rogers, “Success—at Long Last”: The Abo-
lition of the Death Penalty in Massachusetts, 1928–1984, 22 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 281, 352–53 (2002); Garrett Quinn, The Complicated History of 
the Death Penalty in Massachusetts, from the Salem Witch Trials to Dzhokhar 
Tsarnev, MASSLIVE (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.masslive.com/ 
news/boston/index.ssf/2014/02/history_of_the_death_penalty_i.html. 
 149. Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1283 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 287–88 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).  
 150. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491–92 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated, 
986 F.2d 1583 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that a prisoner should not be able to 
benefit from the very delay that the prisoner sought).  
 151. In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights blocked extradition to 
the United States of a German citizen detained in England for a capital mur-
der charge in Virginia. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 472–
75 (1989) (ruling that the anticipated six to eight year stay on death row prior 
to execution would itself violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights prohibiting “torture or . . . inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”). Construing a provision of the Jamaican Constitution, almost 
identical to that of Article 3, the British Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (the highest court of appeal for Jamaica and other Commonwealth 
countries) held that execution after fourteen years on death row was unconsti-
tutional. Pratt v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (Jam.); The Court 
Structure and Hierarchy, THE SUPREME COURT OF JAMAICA, http:// 
www.supremecourt.gov.jm/content/court-structure-and-hierarchy (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2014). The court established the threshold of five years of death row 
confinement as constituting “strong grounds” for a finding of unconstitutional 
“inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.” Pratt, 2 A.C. at 35.  
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addressed by other courts.”152 Because of “its legal complexity 
and its potential for far-reaching consequences,” the issue 
would benefit from further examination by the lower courts be-
fore it percolated up to the Supreme Court.153 Justice Thomas 
assessed the lower courts’ response to Justice Stevens’ invita-
tion as follows: “These courts have resoundingly rejected the 
claim as meritless. I submit that the Court should consider the 
experiment concluded.”154 Justice Breyer disagreed, replying 
that most courts have avoided the merits of Lackey claims and 
denied them instead on procedural grounds.155 Though some 
judges have agreed with Justices Stevens and Breyer as to the 
seriousness of the issue,156 others have not. For example, one 
Fourth Circuit judge dismissed it as “a mockery of our system 
of justice, and an affront to law-abiding citizens . . . absurd . . . 
frivolous . . . subterfuge . . . [a] manipulation . . .  . . .[and] so-
phistic . . ..”157 Despite no lower court favorably recognizing a 
Lackey claim at that time,158 Ninth Circuit Judge Arthur 
Alarcón conjectured in 2007 that the “Supreme Court may one 
day grant certiorari to determine whether such delays violate 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.”159 Seven years later, and nineteen years after 
Lackey, Judge Alarcón’s conjecture is one step closer to coming 
 
 152. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting 
denial of certiorari).  
 153. Id. at 1047.  
 154. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992–93 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in denial of certiorari).  
 155. Id. at 998–99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 156. E.g., Selsor v. Workman, No. 01-CV-0721-CVE-TWL, 2009 WL 
3233806, at *44 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2009) (“This Court agrees that the issue 
of whether it is cruel and unusual to hold an individual for decades on death 
row raises a serious constitutional question.”); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 
1292 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., concurring) (“[L]ike Justices Stevens and 
Breyer in Lackey v. Texas, I do not treat as completely without merit the ar-
gument that lengthy delays in the imposition of the death sentence may 
amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment.” (cita-
tion omitted)).  
 157. Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concur-
ring). 
 158. See, e.g., Sansing v. Ryan, No. CV-11-1035-PHX-SRB, 2013 WL 
474358, at *54 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2013) (denying Lackey claim because neither 
the Supreme Court nor federal circuit courts have recognized the claim as suc-
cessfully establishing an Eighth Amendment violation); Carroll v. State, 114 
So.3d 883, 889 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Pardo v. State, 108 So.3d 558, 569 (Fla. 
2012)) (“‘[N]o federal or state court has accepted the argument that a pro-
longed stay on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.’”).  
 159. Alarcón, supra note 8, at 711.  
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to fruition. On July 16, 2014, Jones v. Chappell became the first 
(American, post-Lackey) case to recognize a Lackey claim.160  
After Lackey, the issue again came before the Supreme 
Court in certiorari petitions filed by prisoners drawing re-
sponses from Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, or Justice Thom-
as, or some combination thereof, concerning their denial of cer-
tiorari. Among these petitions, the prisoner’s death row tenure 
rose from seventeen years in Lackey161 in 1995, to thirty years 
 
 160. No. CV-09-02158-CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 
2014) (ordering “California’s death penalty system unconstitutional and vacat-
ing petitioner’s death sentence” after petitioner had spent nineteen years on 
death row). In ruling that Jones’ death sentence violated the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the court found that 
California’s dysfunctional administration of the death penalty produced sys-
temically inordinate delay. Id. at *1–6. The average delay is twenty-five years. 
Id. at *8. As a consequence of this delay, out of the many on death row, so few 
will be actually executed (rather than die of old age while on death row) as to 
make execution unconstitutionally arbitrary. Id. at *8–9. In addition to arbi-
trariness, the court found that the systemic delay undermined the penological 
purposes upon which the constitutionality of capital punishment rests. Id. at 
*9–11. “In California, the execution of a death sentence is so infrequent, and 
the delays preceding it so extraordinary, that the death penalty is deprived of 
any deterrent or retributive effect it might once have had. Such an outcome is 
antithetical to any civilized notion of just punishment.” Id. at *9.  
Of particular interest to the focus of this Article is the court’s analysis of 
retribution. The court seems to find retribution undermined in three ways. Id. 
at *10–11. First, the sheer interval of time between sentence and execution 
frustrates retribution. Id. at *10. And the longer the delay, the greater the 
diminution of retribution’s value. Id. Second, executions are too infrequent 
and/or too few in number as to significantly further retribution. Id. at *11 (cit-
ing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring) 
(“[W]hen imposition of the [death] penalty reaches a certain degree of infre-
quency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribu-
tion would be measurably satisfied.”)). Third, those few being executed are so 
randomly and arbitrarily selected as to be inconsistent with retribution. Id. 
(“[T]he few executions [the State] does carry out are arbitrary . . . [and] simply 
cannot be reconciled with the asserted purpose of retribution.” (citing Furman, 
408 U.S. at 304–05 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The asserted public belief that 
murderers deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random 
few.”))). 
This Article’s approach to retribution is markedly different from Jones. 
Where Jones assesses the impact on retribution from the sheer temporal delay 
alone, this Article considers the possible nature and duration of pre-execution 
death row incarceration. It assesses the impact on retribution of the combina-
tion of execution plus substantial death row incarceration depending on 
whether that death row incarceration is construed as punishment, a mitiga-
tion of punishment, or simply nothing, or some combination thereof. See infra 
Part III.  
 161. 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiora-
ri). 
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in Smith v. Arizona162 in 2007, and to thirty-nine years in Mu-
hammad v. Florida,163 in 2014. Justice Thomas wrote memo-
randa concurring in the denial of certiorari in four cases.164 Jus-
tice Stevens expressed support for the merit of the prisoners’ 
claims in three cases165 and stressed that denial of certiorari 
“does not constitute a ruling on the merits” in two other cas-
es.166 Justice Breyer dissented in eight cases167 and agreed with 
or joined Justice Stevens in two further cases.168 The next Sec-
tion presents the arguments made by Justices Stevens, Breyer, 
and Thomas, as well as others, regarding Lackey claims. 
B. DEBATING THE LACKEY CLAIM 
This Section first canvasses the principal arguments ad-
vanced by Justices Stevens and Breyer, as well as others, sup-
porting the Lackey claim (that the Combination is unconstitu-
tional). It next surveys the principal arguments of Justice 
Thomas and others opposing the Lackey claim. 
1. Unconstitutional as Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
There are eight principal arguments supporting the Lackey 
claim. The arguments primarily seek to establish the Combina-
tion as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
 
 162. 552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari). 
 163. No. 13-8030-13A674, 2014 WL 37226, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2014) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and stay of execution).  
 164. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1070 (2009) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in denial of certiorari); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Foster v. Florida, 537 
U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); Knight v. 
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiora-
ri).  
 165. See Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., re-
specting denial of certiorari); Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1114 (Stevens, J., re-
specting denial of certiorari); Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.  
 166. See Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 (Stevens, J. respecting denial of certiorari); 
Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).  
 167. See Muhammad, 2014 WL 37226, at *1; Valle v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 1, 1 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay from execution); Smith, 552 
U.S. at 985; Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1119 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari); Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari); Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
 168. See Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067; Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047.  
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Amendment and Gregg. First, the substantial periods of DRI 
common today are unusual.169 In Lackey, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that “a [seventeen-year] delay, if it ever occurred, certain-
ly would have been rare in 1789, and thus the practice of the 
Framers would not justify a denial of petitioner’s claim.”170 In 
Foster v. Florida, Justice Breyer noted that twenty-seven years 
on death row is “unusual by any standard.”171 Second, deter-
rence is not furthered.172 As Justice Stevens contended in Lack-
ey, “the additional deterrent effect from an actual execution 
now, on the one hand, as compared to 17 years on death row 
followed by the prisoner’s continued incarceration for life, on 
the other, seems minimal.”173 In Elledge v. Florida, Justice 
Breyer maintained that after twenty-three years, “an execution 
may well cease to serve the legitimate penological purposes [in-
cluding deterrence] that otherwise provide a necessary consti-
tutional justification for the death penalty.”174 Third, retribu-
tion is not furthered.175 As Justice Stevens argued in Lackey, 
 
 169. E.g., People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, 
C.J., dissenting) (“By the standards in effect when the United States Constitu-
tion was ratified, such a delay [fifteen years] would have been rare, if not un-
heard of.”); Kate McMahon, Dead Man Waiting: Death Row Delays, the Eighth 
Amendment, and What Courts and Legislatures Can Do, 25 BUFF. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 43, 49 (2007) (“At the time the Constitution was drafted, the Framers 
were familiar with a system where the interim between conviction and execu-
tion would be a matter of days or weeks, not years or decades.”).  
 170. 514 U.S. at 1045.  
 171. 537 U.S. at 992.  
 172. See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that delays “lessen the deterrent 
effect of the threat of capital punishment”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
354 n.124 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“For capital punishment to deter 
anybody it must . . . follow swiftly upon completion of the offense.”); Smith v. 
Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“It is 
hard to see how Smith’s execution today [after twenty-seven years on death 
row] would have any deterrent effect.”); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punish-
ment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (1989) (“[Y]ears of delay between sentenc-
ing and execution . . . undermine[] the deterrent effect.”).  
 173. 514 U.S. at 1046.  
 174. 525 U.S. 944, 945 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).  
 175. See, e.g., Smith, 611 F.3d at 1006 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“Executing 
Smith after all this time [twenty-seven years on death row] would go far be-
yond what is necessary to satisfy society’s moral outrage . . . .”); Dwight 
Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Con-
stitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 178 
(1998) (“[T]he execution of an inmate who has spent an inordinate period on 
death row would likely not achieve retribution . . . .”); McMahon, supra note 
169, at 50 (“The state can arguably be said to have already furthered its re-
tributive goals by subjecting the offender to endure almost three decades in 
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“the acceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been 
satisfied by the severe punishment already inflicted [seventeen 
years on death row].”176 Justice Lewis Powell stated that “[t]he 
retributive value of the penalty is diminished as imposition of 
sentence becomes ever farther removed from the time of the of-
fense.”177 Fourth, not only does substantial delay not further the 
penological goals of deterrence and retribution, it undermines 
them.178 In Thompson v. McNeil, Justice Stevens contended 
that substantial delay “diminishes whatever possible benefit 
society might receive from petitioner’s death. It would therefore 
be appropriate to conclude that a punishment of death after 
significant delay is ‘so totally without penological justification 
that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.’”179 In 
Johnson v. Bredesen, Justices Stevens and Breyer concluded 
that “the penological justifications for the death penalty dimin-
ish as the delay lengthens.”180 Fifth, the anxiety produced by 
waiting for one’s death over a prolonged period of time and/or 
the inhumane conditions of DRI constitute psychological tor-
ture which is cruel within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment.181 Justice Stevens observed that “the delay itself subjects 
 
near-solitary confinement . . . .”); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row 
Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death Row Imprisonment Becomes 
Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 198 (1999) (“When a state exe-
cutes a prisoner after he or she has spent a prolonged period of time on death 
row, the sentence is overly retributive.”).  
 176. 514 U.S. at 1045.  
 177. Powell, supra note 172, at 1041. 
 178. E.g., People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1144 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, J., 
dissenting) (“Retribution and deterrence, the two principal social purposes of 
capital punishment, carry less and less force [after substantial delay].”); State 
v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 1013 (Ind. 2007) (Boehm, J., dissenting) (“I . . . find 
the reasoning of Justices Stevens and Breyer [that Lackey-type situations 
frustrate retribution and deterrence and are cruel and unusual punishment] 
to be persuasive and therefore would hold that the Indiana Constitution pre-
vents further pursuit of the death penalty in this case [involving a twenty-five 
year delay].”); Alarcón, supra note 8, at 709 (“Inordinate delays . . . undermine 
the stated purposes of having the death penalty, namely retribution and de-
terrence.”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 17, at 230 (“Deterrence is attenuated 
when it is widely understood that an execution will not occur until many years 
after sentence, if at all. Moreover, the retributive value of executions is dimin-
ished when the person executed has lived a ‘second lifetime’ on death row.”).  
 179. 556 U.S. 1114, 1115 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).  
 180. 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari).  
 181. See, e.g., Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1115 (citing the “dehumanizing ef-
fects” of the prisoner enduring “up to 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by 9-
foot cell”); Simms, 736 N.E.2d at 1143 (“Beyond a certain number of years and 
a certain number of failed attempts by the State to secure a constitutionally 
CHRISTOPHER_5fmt 11/30/2014 2:28 PM 
448 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:421 
 
death row inmates to decades of especially severe, dehumaniz-
ing conditions of confinement.”182 Justice Breyer found as a 
“commonsense conclusion that 33 years in prison under threat 
of execution is cruel.”183 Sixth, a growing number of the highest 
courts in foreign countries ruled such lengthy delays to be cruel 
and unusual punishment and/or a violation of internationally 
recognized human rights.184 Even international courts accepting 
the legality of capital punishment “‘have held that lengthy de-
lay in administering a lawful death penalty renders the ulti-
mate execution in-human, degrading, or unusually cruel.’”185 
Seventh, DRI itself constitutes a separate and additional pun-
ishment that may be excessive when combined with capital 
punishment.186 In Gomez v. Fierro, Justice Stevens maintained 
that “delay can become so excessive as to constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment.”187 And eighth, delay is often due not to 
the prisoner filing frivolous petitions, but the prisoner lawfully 
 
valid sentence of death, the litigation becomes a form of torture in and of it-
self.”); Aarons, supra note 175, at 149 (“While awaiting execution, capital de-
fendants experience mental anguish . . . in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.”).  
 182. Bredesen, 558 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiora-
ri).  
 183. Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from de-
nial of stay).  
 184. E.g., Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respect-
ing denial of certiorari) (“[T]he highest courts in other countries have found 
arguments such as petitioner’s to be persuasive.”); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 
1461, 1487 (9th Cir.) (Norris, J., dissenting) (“McKenzie’s Eighth Amendment 
claim draws further strength from three recent decisions of foreign courts crit-
icizing the American ‘death row phenomenon.’”), opinion adopted on reh’g en 
banc, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 185. Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 1 (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).  
 186. See, e.g., Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“The sentencing judge who initially decided that the 
death sentence was the appropriate punishment now unequivocally states that 
executing Jose Ceja now after 23 years of incarceration on death row is too 
harsh a punishment for his crimes.”); Aarons, supra note 175, at 205 (“[T]he 
period spent awaiting execution is itself a form of punishment regulated by 
the Eighth Amendment.”); Alarcón, supra note 8, at 725 (“[D]eath row prison-
ers are being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment because of their prolonged imprisonment . . . .”); Steiker, 
supra note 137, at 766 n.47 (“The lengthy waits on death row in anticipation of 
execution . . . [may involve] disproportionality.”); Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Jus-
tices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court’s Refusal To Hear a Claim for Inordinate 
Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 577, 607 (2001) (arguing that the death row prisoner “is receiving exces-
sive punishment above and beyond his sentence”). 
 187. 519 U.S. 918, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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pursuing her legal rights and the faulty procedures implement-
ed and established by the states.188 In Knight v. Florida, Justice 
Breyer observed that the delays were due, in significant part, to 
states’ “constitutionally defective death penalty procedures.”189 
In Johnson v. Bredesen, Justice Stevens noted that the prisoner 
was responsible for “little, if any” of the twenty-eight-year de-
lay.190  
2. Constitutional Punishment 
There are ten principal arguments opposing the Lackey 
claim (and defending the constitutionality of the Combination). 
The arguments cluster around the lack of relevant precedent 
that the Combination is unconstitutional, the view that recog-
nition of a Lackey claim would be counterproductive, and the 
notion that prisoners are responsible for and benefit from the 
delay. First, there is no binding American precedent establish-
ing the unconstitutionality of the Combination.191 In Knight, 
Justice Thomas concluded that there is neither Supreme Court 
precedent nor any support in American constitutional law “for 
the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the pano-
ply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain 
when his execution is delayed.”192 Second, international prece-
dent and authority finding such punishment illegitimate is nei-
ther binding nor persuasive.193 In Foster v. Florida, acknowledg-
 
 188. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1471 (“The extraordinary delay in car-
rying out his death sentence is not of McKenzie’s making.”); State v. Azania, 
865 N.E.2d 994, 1012 (Ind. 2007) (Boehm, J., dissenting) (noting that the pris-
oner “has spent at least fifteen years on death row due to flaws in the criminal 
justice system for which he bears no responsibility”); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 
1272, 1291 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., concurring) (“When a defendant is suc-
cessful in his appeals, it cannot fairly be said that he is merely filing frivolous 
appeals in order to buy time.”).  
 189. 528 U.S. at 993. 
 190. 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiora-
ri).  
 191. E.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 
(11th Cir. 2008) (denying prisoner’s Lackey claim “given the total absence of 
Supreme Court precedent”); Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1142 n.231 
(Utah 2010) (“The courts . . . have uniformly rejected Lackey claims.”).  
 192. 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 
 193. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 (“With all due respect to our col-
leagues abroad, we do not believe this view [that delayed executions are un-
lawful] will prevail in the United States.”); Booker v. McNeil, No. 
1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, *40–41 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (denying 
prisoner’s claim that “binding norms of international law” prohibit his execu-
tion after twenty-nine years on death row), aff’d, 684 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir. 
2012).  
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ing that international precedent continues to side against the 
permissibility of such lengthy delays, Justice Thomas declared 
that “this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not 
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”194 Third, 
all punishment produces anxiety.195 Moreover, Justice Thomas 
conjectured, even “[m]urderers . . . who are not apprehended 
and tried suffer from the fear and anxiety that they will one 
day be caught and punished for their crimes.”196 Fourth, recog-
nizing a Lackey claim would only exacerbate the delay.197 In 
Knight, Justice Thomas suggested that allowing a Lackey claim 
would generate the counterproductive effect of “prolong[ing] 
collateral review by giving virtually every capital prisoner yet 
another ground on which to challenge and delay his execu-
tion.”198 Fifth, recognizing Lackey claims would promote “speed 
rather than accuracy.”199 Justice Thomas feared that reviewing 
courts might give “short shrift to a capital defendant’s legiti-
mate claims so as to avoid violating the Eighth Amendment 
right suggested by Justice Breyer.”200 Sixth, the delay results 
from adherence to due process and constitutional safeguards.201 
“‘Consistency would seem to demand that those who accept our 
death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept the lengthy 
delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary conse-
 
 194. 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certi-
orari). 
 195. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems 
of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 198 (2005) (noting that psychological 
dysfunction may be no greater on death row than for non-capital prisoners in 
“supermax” prisons); Sadoff, supra note 140, at 106 (“[T]he very passage of 
time could in fact lessen—not heighten—the anxiety an inmate feels with re-
gard to the prospect of death.”).  
 196. Foster, 537 U.S. at 991.  
 197. See Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1143 (Utah 2010) (invoking the 
prospect of “endless delay”).  
 198. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari). 
 199. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Moore v. 
State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 55 (Ind. 2002) (“To ensure the just administration of the 
death penalty the value of speed should not trump the value of accuracy.”). 
 200. Knight, 528 U.S. at 992. 
 201. E.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1072–73 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari) (delay is unavoidable given the requisite 
procedural safeguards that defendants enjoy); Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 
F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[D]elay, in large part, is a function of the desire 
of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at 
least sufficiently, any argument that might save someone’s life.”).  
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quence.’”202 Seventh, the delay results from prisoners’ frivolous 
appeals.203 In Knight, Justice Thomas argued that “[i]t is incon-
gruous to arm capital defendants with an arsenal of ‘constitu-
tional’ claims with which they may delay their executions, and 
simultaneously to complain when executions are inevitably de-
layed.”204 Eighth, the delay is the choice of, under the control of, 
and the responsibility of, the prisoner.205 Justice Thomas noted 
that a prisoner objecting to delay is not without options: “Peti-
tioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertain-
ties’ by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed 
him to deserve: execution.”206 Ninth, the State is not intention-
ally delaying the execution.207 As the court in Chambers v. 
Bowersox explained, “there is no evidence, not even a claim, 
that the State has deliberately sought to convict [the prisoner] 
invalidly in order to prolong the time before it could secure a 
valid conviction and execute him.”208 And tenth, “the delay in 
carrying out death sentences has been of benefit to death row 
inmates, allowing them to extend their lives . . . .”209 Judge 
Kozinski characterized prisoners’ efforts to challenge their sen-
 
 202. Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in denial of certiorari) (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 992).  
 203. See, e.g., State v. McKenzie, 894 P.2d 289, 294 (Mont. 1995) 
(Leaphart, J., dissenting) (“Obviously the Court cannot allow a defendant to 
bootstrap himself into a cruel and unusual punishment argument by abusing 
the system to his advantage through the repetitive filing of meritless appeals 
and petitions.”); Michael P. Connolly, Better Never than Late: Prolonged Stays 
on Death Row Violate the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 101, 111 (1997) (describing the variety of inappropriate and 
abusive tactics used by defense attorneys to delay executions).  
 204. 528 U.S. at 992.  
 205. E.g., Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117 (noting that the prisoner could have 
accepted his execution but “chose” to challenge it); Bieghler v. State, 839 
N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (“[T]he [twenty-four years] between his conviction 
and the approaching execution flows from his having availed himself of the 
appeals process.”).  
 206. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari) (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari)). 
 207. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[The 
prisoner] cannot now complain of cruel and unusual punishment. . . . [He] does 
not offer any evidence that Texas’ delay in considering his petition was inten-
tional or even negligent.”); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 
1995) (per curiam) (rejecting prisoner’s Lackey claim because, in part, the 
prisoner “has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his case have 
been attributable to negligence or deliberate action of the state”).  
 208. 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998).  
 209. McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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tence as “diminishing the severity of their sentence by endless-
ly postponing the day of reckoning.”210  
In addition to disagreeing about the seriousness of Lackey 
claims and the constitutionality of the Combination, capital 
punishment opponents and proponents even disagree about the 
status of DRI—cruel and unusual punishment versus life-
extending benefit. In an attempt to advance the debate and 
break the impasse between the capital punishment proponents 
and opponents, the next Part converts some of the above un-
supported assertions into supported arguments and applies re-
tributivism to five possible approaches to the legal status of 
substantial DRI.  
III.  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PLUS SUBSTANTIAL DEATH 
ROW INCARCERATION VIOLATES RETRIBUTIVISM   
Because the status of substantial DRI is unclear, this Part 
presents the five possible conceptions of such incarceration. 
First, it constitutes an aggravation of, or a punishment addi-
tional to, capital punishment. Second, substantial DRI serves 
as a mitigation, or reduction, of the capital punishment. Third, 
it is either additional punishment or a mitigation of capital 
punishment. Fourth, substantial DRI is both additional pun-
ishment and a mitigation of capital punishment. Under each of 
these four approaches, this Part demonstrates that the Combi-
nation is disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under re-
tributivism. The fifth approach views substantial DRI as nei-
ther additional punishment nor a mitigation of the capital 
punishment—it is legally and retributively nothing. Though 
possibly allowing retributivism to justify the Combination, this 
fifth approach yields an absurdity. The significant number of 
death row prisoners who die of old age or natural causes prior 
to execution would receive no punishment whatsoever, despite 
being in state custody for decades, for their most heinous of 
crimes. The resulting dilemma is that either substantial DRI 
culminating in death by execution is unjustified under retribu-
tivism or such incarceration culminating in death by old age, or 
non-execution causes, entails the absurdity of blameworthy, 
convicted capital offenders receiving no punishment whatsoev-
er. After considering various ways to resolve the dilemma, this 
Part concludes that the preferable resolution is to convert 
 
 210. Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, in DEBATING THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY 1, 7 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004). 
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death sentences to life imprisonment. Finally, this Part antici-
pates and rebuts three possible objections.  
A. ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT—DISPROPORTIONALLY EXCESSIVE 
Viewing substantial DRI as additional punishment is per-
haps the most obvious approach. Simple common sense sug-
gests that decades-long DRI, under conditions equal to if not 
worse than temporal terms of imprisonment, constitutes pun-
ishment.211 It is punishment in addition to, and in aggravation 
of, the capital punishment. Justices Stevens and Breyer,212 oth-
er judges,213 and numerous commentators214 adopt this ap-
proach, but fail to explain fully how substantial DRI constitutes 
additional punishment. 
While perhaps not crucial, establishing DRI as punishment 
is helpful in two ways in demonstrating that the Combination 
is unconstitutional. First, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not 
 
 211. For examples of the common-sense view that what looks like punish-
ment should be understood as punishment, see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 113 
(2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] sanction that (1) is imposed on everyone 
who commits a [particular] criminal offense, (2) is not imposed on anyone else, 
and (3) severely impairs a person’s liberty is punishment.”); Jenny Roberts, 
The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 
MINN. L. REV. 670, 708–09 (2008) (asserting that civil commitment of certain 
sex offenders is “quite similar to incarceration” and thus constitutes punish-
ment).  
 212. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in denial of certiorari) (“If the death sentence is ultimately set aside, or its ex-
ecution delayed for a prolonged period, the imprisonment during that period is 
nevertheless a significant form of punishment.”); supra note 187 and accom-
panying text.  
 213. United States ex rel. DelVecchio v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., No. 95 C 6637, 
1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1995) (acknowledging that prisoner’s 
sixteen years of DRI may constitute “additional punishment”); see, e.g., People 
v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 115 (Cal. 2001) (arguing that prisoner’s nine years of 
DRI furthers the goals of punishment by “increasing the penalty imposed for 
the commission of capital crimes”), abrogated by People v. Harris, 185 P.3d 
727 (Cal. 2008); cf. Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (characterizing the prisoner’s twenty-three years of 
DRI as a “de facto sentence”).  
 214. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Innocence Abroad: The Extradition Cases 
and the Future of Capital Litigation, 81 OR. L. REV. 161, 171 (2002) (“[D]eath 
row itself represents unacceptable punishment.”); Adam M. Samaha, Undue 
Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 668 (2006) (“Incarceration pending execution is 
undoubtedly a component of punishment . . . .”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 
17, at 230–31 (“The death penalty now encompasses two separate punish-
ments: lengthy incarceration . . . followed by an execution.” (emphasis added)); 
supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and un-
usual ‘punishments.’”215 If substantial DRI is not punishment, 
then one might challenge Lackey claim supporters to explain 
how the addition of a nonpunishment (DRI) to a punishment 
that is not clearly cruel and unusual (capital punishment) com-
bines to create a cruel and unusual punishment. If instead, DRI 
is punishment, it is easier to explain how the addition of one 
punishment to a second punishment that is not cruel and unu-
sual might combine to create a cruel and unusual punishment. 
Second, capital punishment is unconstitutional if it fails to fur-
ther the legitimate penological goals of punishment, including 
retributivism.216 As a justification of punishment, that which 
retributivism finds justified or unjustified is most clearly pun-
ishment.217 If substantial DRI is not punishment, then one 
might again challenge Lackey claim supporters to explain how 
the addition of a nonpunishment (DRI) to a justified punish-
ment (capital punishment) combines to create an unjustified 
punishment. But, if instead, substantial DRI is punishment, 
then it is easier to explain how the addition of one punishment 
to a second, justified punishment might create a combined un-
justified punishment. 
While clearly a punishment “look-alike[],”218 whether sub-
stantial DRI constitutes (criminal) punishment or instead a civ-
il, regulatory sanction is far from clear.219 No American court 
 
 215. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis added); ac-
cord Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (stressing that the Eighth 
Amendment “bans only cruel and unusual punishment”).  
 216. See supra notes 56–57, 64–71, 90–92 and accompanying text.  
 217. A variant of retributivism applies to suffering regardless of whether it 
comes in a punitive or non-punitive form. See Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds 
of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433, 
437–38 (R. A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (explaining that retributiv-
ism maintains offenders deserve suffering, even if it does not constitute pun-
ishment); Husak, supra note 107, at 972 (“[O]ur retributive beliefs only re-
quire that culpable wrongdoers be given their just deserts by being made to 
suffer [regardless of whether it constitutes punishment].”). Of course, under 
this version of retributivism it would be far easier to establish the Combina-
tion as disproportionally excessive and unjustified. Even if the substantial 
DRI does not constitute punishment, it clearly constitutes suffering. Knight v. 
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to deny 
the suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution . . . .”). But an argu-
ment relying on an atypical version of retributivism would presumably fail to 
persuade capital punishment proponents.  
 218. Kolber, supra note 26, at 1142 (referring to nominally civil sanctions 
that involve the same suffering and deprivation as punishment).  
 219. In general, whether a nominally civil sanction is so punitive in effect 
as to constitute criminal punishment is a “problem [that] has been extremely 
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considering a Lackey claim has held that it does constitute pun-
ishment. But equally, no such court has held that it does not 
constitute punishment. Under the federal Bail Reform Act, 
post-conviction, pre-punishment confinement nominally consti-
tutes a detention220 similar to a pre-trial detention.221 In United 
States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Bail Reform Act’s authorization of pre-trial detention of the de-
fendants on the ground that they posed a danger to the com-
munity constituted impermissible punishment.222 Noting that 
not all detentions constitute punishment, the Court first looked 
to legislative intent223 and then whether the detention was ex-
cessive in relation to any legitimate regulatory goal.224 “The leg-
islative history . . . clearly indicates that Congress did not for-
mulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for 
dangerous individuals.”225 Rather, “preventing danger to the 
community is a legitimate regulatory goal.”226 The Court “con-
clude[d] that the detention imposed by the Act falls on the reg-
ulatory side of the dichotomy.”227  
Though a broad reading of Salerno suggests that all (not 
just pre-trial) detentions imposed by the Bail Reform Act are 
 
difficult and elusive of solution.” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
168 (1963). For critical views on drawing the punitive/nonpunitive distinction, 
see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the Court’s manipulation of the punitive/regulatory distinction 
as “merely redefin[ing] any measure which is claimed to be punishment as 
‘regulation,’ and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its imposi-
tion”); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the 
Era of Mass Incarceration, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1808 (2012) (lamenting 
that “the quest for a sharp difference between punitive and regulatory 
measures is futile”).  
 220. 18 U.S.C. § 3141(b) (2012) (“A judicial officer of a court . . . shall order 
that, pending imposition or execution of sentence, or pending appeal of convic-
tion or sentence, a person be released or detained under this chapter.”).  
 221. For discussion of Eighth Amendment claims concerning pretrial de-
tention, see Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1009 (2013).  
 222. 481 U.S. at 745–48 (majority opinion). 
 223. Id. at 746–47 (“[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not in-
exorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. 
To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible pun-
ishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent.” (citation 
omitted)).  
 224. Id. at 747 (citing and applying two factors of the seven-factor test from 
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69). For discussion of the seven-factor test, see infra 
notes 235–38 and accompanying text.  
 225. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.  
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
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nonpunitive, the substantial DRI challenged in Lackey claims 
still might constitute punishment under Salerno for two rea-
sons. First, the Court noted that “the maximum length of pre-
trial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of 
the Speedy Trial Act.”228 In a subsequent case, the Court also 
stressed that the detention found constitutional in Salerno was 
“strictly limited in duration.”229 Quite plausibly, upwards of 
thirty years or more of DRI would exceed such stringent and 
strict limitations on the duration of the detention. Second, the 
Court strongly suggested that sufficiently lengthy detention 
constitutes punishment: “We intimate no view as to the point at 
which detention in a particular case might become excessively 
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ regu-
latory goal.”230 While unsure of the precise point at which the 
duration of a detention would convert it from regulatory to pu-
nitive, the Court is clearly stating that a sufficiently lengthy 
detention constitutes punishment. Surely, over thirty years of 
DRI qualifies as “excessively prolonged, and therefore puni-
tive.”231 If not, what possible period of detention could qualify?  
Apart from Salerno, there is another basis for DRI to con-
stitute additional punishment. Nominally civil sanctions may 
nonetheless constitute punishment under the “‘intent-effects’ 
test.”232 The test’s first step assesses the legislature’s intention 
as to the nature of the sanction.233 If the legislature’s intent was 
that the sanction be punishment, the test is complete and the 
sanction is punishment.234 If the legislature instead intended to 
establish a civil sanction, the test is not complete. Undertaking 
the test’s second step, courts “‘have inquired further whether 
the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or ef-
fect’ as to ‘transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil rem-
edy into a criminal penalty.’”235  
 
 228. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 229. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992).  
 230. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4 (emphasis added). This proposition con-
tinues to have vitality. See, e.g., United States v. Stanford, 722 F. Supp. 2d 
803, 806, 808 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (citing and quoting this proposition).  
 231. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4. 
 232. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997).  
 233. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); see also Kennedy 
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963). 
 234. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99; 
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.  
 235. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
248–49 (1980)).  
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This second step assesses the effects of the nominally civil 
sanction by considering the following seven Kennedy v. Mendo-
za-Martinez factors:236  
(1) “[W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; 
(4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment—retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to 
which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and 
(7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned.”237 
The Court emphasizes that “‘these factors must be considered 
in relation to the statute on its face’”238 and that “‘only the 
clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and 
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a 
criminal penalty.’”239  
DRI clearly satisfies the first five factors. Incarceration is 
clearly an affirmative restraint on physical liberty (factor 1)240 
that has historically been regarded as a paradigmatic punish-
ment (factor 2)241 promoting the traditional aims of punishment 
(factor 4). And a finding of the requisite criminal mens rea of 
the offense (factor 3)242 and the criminal behavior constituting 
the offense (factor 5) necessarily precedes the imposition of 
DRI.  
 
 236. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69).  
 237. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168–69) 
(emphasis omitted).  
 238. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169). In a pre-
vious case, the Court adopted a different standard—evaluating the “actual 
sanctions imposed.” United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989). Hudson 
rejects the Halper test as “ill considered.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101.  
 239. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).  
 240. See, e.g., Doe, 538 U.S. at 100 (referring to “the punishment of impris-
onment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint” (citing 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104)).  
 241. See, e.g., Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104 (referring to the “‘infamous punish-
ment’ of imprisonment” (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 
(1960))); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (“Confinement in a pris-
on . . . is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards.”).  
 242. Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997) (“[U]nlike a crimi-
nal statute, no finding of scienter is required to commit an individual who is 
found to be a sexually violent predator.”). In contrast, death row incarceration 
may only follow conviction under a criminal statute and thus after a finding of 
the requisite scienter.  
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DRI, however, fails to satisfy at least one of the last two 
factors. Factor 6 is clearly not satisfied: there are non-punitive 
purposes served by DRI including safeguarding the community 
and ensuring the presence of the convict at the imposition of 
his punishment.243 Regarding factor 7, the sanction actually 
imposed—upwards of thirty years or more of DRI—is arguably 
excessive relative to the above goals. But considering, as Hud-
son v. United States requires, the sanction imposed by “‘the 
statute on its face’”244—a period of indefinite detention—it is 
arguably not excessive. As discussed above, however, Salerno 
specifically stated that a sufficiently prolonged detention would 
be excessive and thus constitute punishment.245 Moreover, it is 
unclear whether the Hudson standard of assessing the sanction 
“‘on its face’”246 is still required. In a case subsequent to Hud-
son, the Court failed to require the Hudson standard.247 As a re-
sult, it is unclear whether the seventh factor supports deten-
tion pending imposition of a sentence as punitive or non-
punitive. 
Whether satisfaction of five or possibly six of the seven fac-
tors meets the proviso that “‘only the clearest proof’”248 suffices 
to transform a nominal civil sanction into a criminal punish-
ment is unclear.249 But given that there is no requirement that 
all of the factors be satisfied,250 satisfaction of five or six of the 
seven factors may well constitute the requisite ‘“clearest 
proof.’”251 As a result, the nominally civil sanction of DRI plau-
sibly qualifies as punishment.  
An exhaustive and definitive analysis of whether suffi-
ciently prolonged DRI constitutes punishment is both beyond 
 
 243. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (2012) (authorizing detention to prevent the con-
vict from “flee[ing] or pos[ing] a danger to the . . . community”). 
 244. 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 
169 (1963)).  
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 223–24.  
 246. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169).  
 247. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97–105 (2003) (applying the seven-
factor test without mentioning the ‘on its face’ Hudson standard).  
 248. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242, 249 (1980)).  
 249. On the difficulty of clearly applying the factors, see Wayne A. Logan, 
The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1261, 1282 (1998) (“The Mendoza-Martinez factors over the years have 
been applied in a highly selective and ultimately inconsistent manner.”).  
 250. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–105; see also Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 (char-
acterizing the factors as “neither exhaustive nor dispositive”).  
 251. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).  
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the scope and unnecessary for the purposes of this Article. 
Apart from the assertions of Justices Stevens and Breyer, other 
judges, and commentators,252 there are two bases for sufficient-
ly prolonged death row detention to formally constitute pun-
ishment. First, Salerno conceives of sufficiently prolonged de-
tention as punishment.253 Second, satisfying five or six factors of 
the seven-factor test for punitive effect plausibly establishes 
sufficiently prolonged detention as punishment.254 That the 
nominally civil sanction of DRI, particularly when sufficiently 
prolonged, merely plausibly constitutes punishment suffices to 
ground DRI as punishment as one of the five possible ap-
proaches to the status of substantial DRI.  
If substantial DRI constitutes punishment, the following 
argument demonstrates that the Combination is disproportion-
ally excessive, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism: 
(1) Under retributivism, death by execution matches the 
moral and legal desert of at least some offenders. Death by exe-
cution, for such offenders, is a proportional, deserved, and justi-
fied punishment. 
(2) Therefore, punishment substantially greater, or sub-
stantially less, than capital punishment would not match the 
moral and legal desert of such offenders. Such punishment 
would thus be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified un-
der retributivism.  
(3)  Substantial DRI constitutes a substantial, additional 
punishment. 
(4) Therefore, the Combination is disproportionally exces-
sive, undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism for such 
offenders. 
Explaining each step in the argument might be helpful. 
Step 1 accepts as a premise that retributivism justifies capital 
punishment for at least some offenders.255 Following from step 
1, step 2 reasons that if capital punishment alone is the pun-
ishment that an offender deserves (and thus is proportional 
and justified) under retributivism, then a punishment substan-
tially different than capital punishment would be undeserved, 
disproportional, and unjustified. A punishment substantially 
 
 252. See supra notes 185–86, 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 223–29.  
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 236–51.  
 255. For the view that, under retributivism, death by execution is the only 
deserved, proportional, and justified punishment for some offenders, see supra 
notes 131–36 and accompanying text.  
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greater or more severe than capital punishment alone would 
thus be undeserved, disproportionally excessive, and unjusti-
fied under retributivism.  
While steps 1–2, as well as 4, are fairly straightforward, 
step 3 is easily contested. Step 3 asserts as a premise that sub-
stantial DRI constitutes substantial, additional punishment. 
While the premise reflects a plausible approach to the status of 
DRI,256 there are other approaches that are also plausible. The 
premise of step 3 is not strenuously argued for or defended be-
cause one may reject step 3 while still reaching the same con-
clusion that the Combination is unjustified under retributiv-
ism. In arguments below, different premises as to the status of 
substantial DRI will replace the premise of step 3. Even with 
this replacement, the conclusion will remain that retributivism 
is unsatisfied.  
Step 4 concludes that if capital punishment alone is the 
proportional, deserved, and justified punishment under retrib-
utivism for some offenders, and if substantial DRI constitutes a 
substantial, additional punishment, then the Combination is 
disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified under retributiv-
ism for such offenders. If capital punishment alone is the pro-
portional, deserved, and justified punishment under retributiv-
ism for a particular offender, then adding a substantial 
punishment to the capital punishment necessarily makes the 
Combination disproportionally excessive, undeserved, and un-
justified under retributivism.  
One might concede that substantial DRI constitutes pun-
ishment in addition to death by execution but object that it is 
additional punishment integral to the offender’s sentence of 
capital punishment. That is, rather than it being additional 
punishment extrinsic to the capital punishment it is additional 
punishment intrinsic to the capital punishment.257 Under this 
objection, capital punishment that includes the integral compo-
nent of the additional punishment of substantial DRI is noth-
ing more than capital punishment itself. Given the stipulated 
 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 252–54.  
 257. See People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 263 (Cal. 1998) (“Confinement in 
prison following a judgment of death is part and parcel of the administration 
of the death penalty.”); MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT 108 (2011) (discussing the issue outside of the Lackey claim context 
and arguing that for a person sentenced to death, “his incarceration on death 
row is itself a part of his [capital] punishment”). But see PRIMORATZ, supra 
note 101, at 164 (“[T]he interval between sentencing someone to death and 
carrying out the sentence is not a part of capital punishment itself.”).  
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premise that retributivism justifies capital punishment (step 1 
in the above argument), a capital punishment that includes 
everything which is integral or intrinsic to capital punishment 
must also be justified. 
The objection fails, however, because the concession which 
is a premise of the objection is fatal to the objection. Conceding 
that substantial DRI constitutes additional punishment 
(whether extrinsic or intrinsic) triggers the possible problem of 
explaining why some convicted capital offenders receive a pun-
ishment of death by execution plus, for example, thirty years 
imprisonment on death row and some receive death by execu-
tion plus only five years on death row. If the former are more 
blameworthy and thus deserving of more punishment than the 
latter, then there is no problem. Each might be receiving the 
punishment each deserves. But there does not seem to be any 
correlation between extra years on death row and greater de-
sert. Offenders spend more or less time on death row depending 
on procedural issues that have little to do with their desert.258 If 
any correlation exists, however, it would be an inverse correla-
tion. Offenders with comparatively less desert spend more time 
on death row because their guilt, and the procedures that es-
tablished their guilt, are more open to attack and litigation 
which thereby extends their time on death row.259 In contrast, 
offenders whose guilt was soundly established will have com-
paratively fewer opportunities to litigate and thereby extend 
their time on death row. As a result, conceding that substantial 
DRI is additional punishment undermines the objection. The 
objection fails because greater amounts of the additional pun-
ishment of DRI (even if integral to the capital punishment) are 
 
 258. See Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of 
the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1197 (2009) (noting that ra-
ther than the extent of the delay between sentencing and execution being 
based on retributivist considerations of desert, “the delay occurs largely be-
cause of procedural wrangling”).  
 259. See People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J., 
dissenting) (“In nearly every instance where an execution remains to be car-
ried out after a decade or more, the additional litigation has been necessary to 
address errors occasioned by the prosecution or attributable to incompetent 
representation.”); Dwight Aarons, Getting out of This Mess: Steps Toward Ad-
dressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1998) (“[A] defendant is more likely to be on death row for 
an inordinate period when the case is on the margins of death eligibility and 
errors occur during the state’s processing of the case.”). As an example, consid-
er Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting to denial of 
certiorari), in which the prisoner’s “three successful appeals account for 18 of 
the 23 years of delay.” Id. at 945 (emphasis added).  
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not based on greater desert and are thus unjustified under re-
tributivism.  
B. MITIGATION—DISPROPORTIONALLY LENIENT 
Courts rejecting Lackey claims often argue that rather 
than prejudicing prisoners, substantial DRI supplies the bene-
fit of extended life.260 Some courts and commentators further 
argue that the benefit of extended life reduces or lessens the 
severity or retributive value of the capital punishment.261 
Though the relevance is unclear, these arguments are meant to 
supply a basis for rejecting Lackey claims. These arguments 
suggest the second possible approach to the status of substan-
tial DRI: it is a reduction or diminution of the capital punish-
ment. Rather than an aggravation, it is a mitigation of the cap-
ital punishment. As one court explained in comparing capital 
with noncapital punishment, “[i]t is the common judgment of 
man that . . . punishment which leaves life is less than that 
which ends it.”262 On this basis, punishment that leaves more 
life (delayed capital punishment) is less than that which leaves 
less life (undelayed capital punishment).  
Accepting the claim that substantial DRI constitutes a mit-
igation of capital punishment, however, does not support the 
position of the capital punishment proponents who advance the 
claim. Accepting the claim does not lead to the conclusion that 
the Combination is justified under retributivism. Retributivism 
requires that offenders be given the punishment that they de-
serve—no more and no less.263 Punishments less than what are 
deserved are as unjustified as punishments that are more than 
what are deserved.264 Thus, undeserved mitigations of punish-
ments are no less unjustified than undeserved aggravations of 
 
 260. See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) 
(rejecting prisoner’s Lackey claim because, in part, “delay in carrying out exe-
cutions benefits inmates, allowing them to extend their lives” (citing McKenzie 
v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466–67 (9th Cir. 1995))); People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 
1018 (Cal. 1992) (in bank [sic]) (denying Lackey claim because, in part, “the 
delay—again, no matter how long—benefitted defendant rather than preju-
diced him because the delay prolonged his life”).  
 261. E.g., People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 115 (Cal. 2001) (“[D]efendant, by de-
laying his execution for these past nine years, has already reduced the full re-
tributive function of execution, and indefinitely rendered his status more like 
that of a life prisoner . . . .”); supra note 209 and accompanying text.  
 262. People ex rel. Patrick v. Frost, 117 N.Y.S. 524, 527–28 (App. Div. 
1909). 
 263. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text.  
 264. See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text. 
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punishment. The following argument, with this second ap-
proach as a new premise, demonstrates that the Combination is 
disproportionally lenient, undeserved, and unjustified under 
retributivism:  
(1) Under retributivism, death by execution matches the 
moral and legal desert of at least some offenders. Death by exe-
cution, for such offenders, is a proportional, deserved, and justi-
fied punishment. 
(2) Therefore, punishment substantially greater, or sub-
stantially less, than capital punishment would not match the 
moral and legal desert of such offenders. Such punishment 
would thus be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified un-
der retributivism.  
(3)  Substantial DRI constitutes a substantial mitigation of 
capital punishment. 
(4) Therefore, the Combination is disproportionally lenient, 
undeserved, and unjustified under retributivism for such of-
fenders. 
The argument is similar to the preceding argument in Part 
III.A. The principal difference is the new premise in step 3. 
While the premise reflects a plausible approach to the status of 
DRI,265 there are other approaches that are also plausible. In 
arguments below, different premises as to the status of sub-
stantial DRI will replace the premise of step 3. Even with this 
replacement, the conclusion will remain that retributivism is 
unsatisfied. Step 4 concludes that if capital punishment alone 
is the proportional, deserved, and justified punishment under 
retributivism for some offenders, and if substantial DRI consti-
tutes a substantial mitigation of capital punishment, then the 
Combination is disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified 
under retributivism for such offenders.266  
One might object that imposing a punishment less severe 
than what the offender deserves does satisfy one version of re-
tributivism, variously termed negative or weak retributivism.267 
A lessened or mitigated capital punishment would satisfy nega-
tive or weak retributivism, even for an offender who deserves a 
full or unmitigated capital punishment. The difficulty with 
negative retributivism, however, is that it fails to affirmatively 
 
 265. See supra notes 209–10, 260–62 and accompanying text.  
 266. Construing substantial DRI as a mitigation of capital punishment also 
yields an absurdity. See infra Part III.E and note 295.  
 267. See supra note 129.  
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provide a justification for any punishment.268 It merely provides 
a ceiling on the amount of punishment that may justifiably be 
imposed.269 A mitigated capital punishment would no more sat-
isfy negative retributivism than a $5 fine or even no punish-
ment—each is less than what the offender deserves. Imposing a 
mitigated (or any type of) capital punishment that no more sat-
isfies or contributes to the goals or purposes of negative retrib-
utivism than a $5 fine or even no punishment at all would be 
pointless, needless, unnecessary, and thus excessive, and thus 
cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.270 
Negative retributivism (allowing any lesser punishment or 
even no punishment at all) violates the very claim on which the 
proponents of the constitutionality of capital punishment de-
pend—capital punishment, at least for some offenders, is the 
only deserved, proportional, and justified punishment under re-
tributivism.271 As a result, the objection that a mitigated capital 
punishment would satisfy negative retributivism, while true, 
only serves to undermine the imposition of capital punishment 
in general. For the capital punishment proponent, embracing 
negative retributivism only hurts, it does not help.  
C. EITHER ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT OR MITIGATION—EITHER 
DISPROPORTIONALLY EXCESSIVE OR LENIENT 
Whether substantial DRI constitutes additional punish-
ment or a mitigation of capital punishment is unclear.272 Each 
approach is plausible. From this uncertainty, a third possible 
approach emerges: it is either additional punishment or a miti-
gation of capital punishment. The following argument, with 
this third approach as a new premise, demonstrates that the 
Combination is undeserved, disproportional, and unjustified 
under retributivism: 
(1) Under retributivism, death by execution matches the 
moral and legal desert of at least some offenders. Death by exe-
cution, for such offenders, is a proportional, deserved, and justi-
fied punishment. 
 
 268. See supra note 129.  
 269. See supra note 129. 
 270. See supra notes 56–57, 64–71 and accompanying text.  
 271. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Carol Steiker, The Death Penalty and Deontology, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 441, 446 (John Deigh & David 
Dolinko eds., 2011) (“[I]t becomes difficult to know whether to consider lengthy 
delay as a harm or a benefit to any particular death row inmate.”).  
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(2) Therefore, punishment substantially greater, or sub-
stantially less, than capital punishment would not match the 
moral and legal desert of such offenders. Such punishment 
would thus be disproportional, undeserved, and unjustified un-
der retributivism.  
(3)  Substantial DRI constitutes either a substantial addi-
tional punishment or a substantial mitigation of capital pun-
ishment. 
(4) Therefore, the Combination is disproportional (either 
excessive or lenient), undeserved, and unjustified under retrib-
utivism for such offenders. 
The argument is similar to the two preceding arguments in 
Part III.A–B. The principal difference is the new premise in 
step 3. Regardless of the different premises, the conclusion of 
each argument is largely the same—the Combination is dispro-
portional (either excessive or lenient), undeserved, and unjusti-
fied under retributivism.273  
D. BOTH ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT AND MITIGATION—
UNJUSTIFIED 
While the previous approach was disjunctive, the fourth 
approach is conjunctive. Substantial DRI is both additional 
punishment and a mitigation of capital punishment. People v. 
Ochoa, wherein the court found that a nine-year delay both in-
creased and decreased the prisoner’s punishment, somewhat 
illustrates this approach.274 The court’s argument for increase: 
the delay “increase[es] the penalty imposed for the commission 
of capital crimes.”275 The court’s argument for decrease: the de-
lay “has already reduced the full retributive function of execu-
tion, and indefinitely rendered [the defendant’s] status more 
like that of a life prisoner.”276 
Under this fourth possible approach, substantial DRI is 
both an additional punishment of one type—incarceration—and 
a mitigation of another type—capital punishment. With each 
year on death row, the prisoner suffers an additional year of in-
carceration but “enjoys” an additional year of life (thereby de-
 
 273. Construing substantial DRI as either additional punishment or a mit-
igation of capital punishment may also yield an absurdity. See infra Part III.E 
and note 295.  
 274. 28 P.3d 78, 114–15 (Cal. 2001) (denying Lackey claim because the de-
lay does not frustrate the deterrent and retributive goals of punishment).  
 275. Id. at 115.  
 276. Id.  
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creasing the severity of execution). One might be tempted to 
conclude the net effect is necessarily a wash. The decrease in 
capital punishment offsets the increase of incarceral punish-
ment. The disproportionally lenient component offsets the dis-
proportionally excessive component. But only if capital and 
incarceral punishment are the same type of punishment would 
the net effect be necessarily a wash. 
As obviously different types of punishment, the net result 
may not be a wash. As Justice Stewart explained, “[t]he penalty 
of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, 
not in degree but in kind.”277 That is, the difference is not mere-
ly quantitative: “the penalty of death is qualitatively different 
from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its 
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year 
prison term differs from one of only a year or two.”278  
Because capital and incarceral punishment are qualitative-
ly different, there are three possible net effects. First, for each 
additional year on death row, the increase in incarceral pun-
ishment substantially exceeds the decrease in capital punish-
ment. If so, the Combination is disproportionally excessive. Se-
cond, the increase in incarceral punishment is substantially 
less than the decrease in capital punishment. If so, the Combi-
nation is disproportionally lenient. Third, the increase in 
incarceral punishment is roughly equivalent to the decrease in 
capital punishment. If so, the punitive value of the Combina-
tion would be roughly equivalent to capital punishment alone. 
Under the first two possible net effects, the Combination vio-
lates retributivism. Only under the third possible net effect 
might the Combination satisfy retributivism. 
So which is the correct net effect? The correct net effect 
may be indeterminate. Comparing the punitive value of addi-
tional years of incarceration with the mitigating value of addi-
tional years of life is incommensurate. There is no obvious con-
version rate between the two different types of punishment. It 
is perhaps apples and oranges. Both because of and despite this 
indeterminacy, retributivism fails to justify the Combination. 
Because the correct net effect is indeterminate, whether re-
tributivism justifies the Combination is indeterminate. But 
punishment requires affirmative justification; lacking an af-
firmative justification the imposition of punishment is unjusti-
 
 277. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 278. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
